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who decide over their consumption levels and the levels of investment
in human capital of their immediate descendants. The objective of
the paper is to identify the impact of strategic interactions between
consecutive generations on the time path of human capital accumu-
lation. To this end, we characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE) in such an economy and derive the sufficient conditions for its
existence and uniqueness. The equilibrium path is computed using a
novel constructive approach: extending Reffett and Woz´ny (2008), we
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1 Introduction
It is nowadays both intuitively clear and widely acknowledged in the litera-
ture that individuals, when making long-term economic decisions, frequently
transcend the narrow notion of self-interest (Arrondel and Masson, 2006).
One particular reason for this is the fact that apart from their own well-
being, people usually care about the well-being of their children as well.
Intergenerational altruism is thus a natural source of linkages between con-
secutive generations. More precisely, strategic interactions of this sort should
be especially apparent in relation to schooling: on the one hand, a substan-
tial fraction of investment in accumulating human capital of an individual is
made by her parents, while on the other hand, these parents cannot fully an-
ticipate what use will be eventually made of these personal assets (Becker and
Tomes, 1986; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Lochner, 2008; Loury, 1981; Orazem
and Tesfatsion, 1997).1
Since upon growing up, the children will themselves become independent
decision makers caring also for their own children, the parents who derive
utility from (among other things) the utility of their children should logically
find themselves facing an infinite-horizon planning problem (i.e. parents care
for children who care for grandchildren who care for great-grandchildren,
etc.). This leads to the standard approach of constructing Ramsey-type
models with dynastic optimization where the benevolent dynastic head finds
the optimal allocation once and for all. Obviosuly, this approach is extremely
useful, well-documented in the literature, and it has found many interesting
applications. There is however an important reason why we believe that
alternative approaches should be studied with great attention as well: in
fact, there is convincing empirical evidence from a variety of research fields
– ranging from dynamics of natural resource extraction to market bubbles
– that actual decision makers tend to be quite myopic, especially when the
actual planning horizon exceeds their lifetime.
Myopia, translated into the language of intergenerational linkages, means
that even if the next consecutive generation’s consumption is fully taken into
account in the original generation’s decision problem, there must exist some
finite cut-off point beyond which the consumption of further generations does
not matter. And it is precisely the inclusion of such a finite cut-off which
1The classic works within the human capital accumulation literature, such as Mincer
(1958) or Ben-Porath (1967), focus primarily on the other component of investment in
education which is individuals’ own purposeful educational spending motivated by the ex-
pected increases in their future earnings. The Ben-Porath’s model specification is however
already flexible enough to allow for intergenerational transmission of human capital as
well.
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takes us from the standard Ramsey-type dynastic optimization frameworks to
models where the planning problem becomes strategic. As the natural first
step in this procedure, this article considers strategic interactions between
two generations only: the original generation cares for the consumption of
its children, but not of its grandchildren. Pushing the cut-off point further
would be a natural extension which we leave for further work.
The point of departure of the current article is the following. The orig-
inal generation (i.e. the parents) would like to choose their consumption
level and the level of investment in human capital of their children optimally
which requires considering the possible options the children will face in the
subsequent period – when they will themselves become independent util-
ity maximizers. The parents would therefore like to embed their children’s
optimization problems in their own and thus become “leaders” of such an
intergenerational strategic game. Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be
carried out directly: since the children’s optimization problem embeds the
optimization problem of their own children, and so forth ad infinitum, we end
up with an infinite series of embedded strategic games. The problem with
applying usual fixed-point arguments here is that the strategic component of
the embedded games creates a “vicious circle” of strategy space (Leininger,
1986) which has obstructed the development of economic theories in this vein
for many years (see e.g. Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968)). This
issue has been resolved only recently, thanks to the crucial technical develop-
ments of Amir (1996a,c) and Nowak (2006). The current article applies these
developments to the case of intergenerational interactions in human capital
accumulation.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we identify the impact
of strategic interactions between consecutive generations on the time path
of human capital accumulation in an economy populated by a sequence of
generations allowed to decide over their consumption levels as well as over
the levels of investment in human capital of their immediate descendants.
We are able to obtain clear-cut results here thanks to a novel constructive
approach to computing Markov perfect equilibria in games of intergenera-
tional altruism which has recently been put forward by Reffett and Woz´ny
(2008). Second, we benchmark our results against two standard models,
both of which assume away strategic interactions across generations: (i) the
usual Ramsey-type model with dynastic optimization, and (ii) a model with
joy-of-giving altruism (used by, among numerous others, Artige, Camacho,
and de la Croix (2004)). Our most important result here is an analytical
proof that, other things equal, human capital accumulation is unambigu-
ously smaller in the strategic model than in the dynastic model. We also run
a series of numerical exercises quantifying how large the differences between
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the optimal human capital accumulation decisions could be whether strategic
interactions are present or not. Additionally, we also show numerically that
the joy-of-giving altruism model differs markedly from the strategic model,
insofar the implied optimal decisions cannot be unambiguously compared
against each other: for most parameter values, joy-of-giving altruism implies
more human capital investment than the strategic model, but for a range of
specific parametric choices, this relationship is reversed. At the same time,
our numerical examples show how the constructive approach to computing
Markov perfect equilibria could be used in computational practice.
The two crucial contributions of this paper are, therefore, purely theoret-
ical. The lack of immediate empirical applications of our theory comes from
the fact that the model developed herein, though based on sound microeco-
nomic foundations, is admittedly simplified. We are therefore convinced that
it would be a stark exaggeration to calibrate it in its current form in order to
draw quantitative implications aimed at discriminating between competing
theories of human capital accumulation based on empirical evidence. Instead,
our model should be considered as an important first step: it is the first
model of human capital accumulation which integrates fully-specified strate-
gic interactions between consecutive generations into an (otherwise standard)
overlapping-generations framework.
Technically, to show existence and uniqueness of Markov perfect equilib-
rium (MPE) in an economy with strategic interactions we use the method of
monotone operators pioneered by Coleman (1991) and developed further by
Datta and Reffett (see a survey of these methods in Datta and Reffett (2006)).
One important caveat is that in our current case, the appropriate operator
whose fixed points are the Markov perfect equilibria of the considered econ-
omy turns out to be decreasing while the relevant theorems summarized by
Datta and Reffett (2006) deal with increasing operators only. Hence, we can-
not apply the established methods directly: the appropriate theorems must
be generalized first.2 Several of these generalizations have already been made
by Reffett and Woz´ny (2008) in their constructive study of Markov perfect
equilibria in stochastic games of intergenerational altruism, but even those
results have to be generalized further in order to accomodate the problem
we are dealing with here. Hence, we have included complete proofs for all
theorems presented in the text.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
lay out our basic model with strategic interactions and derive the principal
2Even more generally, the geometrical characteristics of monotone operators in abstract
cones and their fixed point properties have been described by Guo and Lakshmikantham
(1988) as well as Guo, Cho, and Zhu (2004).
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theoretical results. In Section 3 we compare this model with two benchmark
models where no strategic interactions are allowed. Section 4 provides an
illustrative numerical example for our calculations of the preceding chapters.
Section 5 discusses the role of strategic interactions in shaping human capital
investment decisions. Section 6 concludes. Definitions and proofs of theorems
have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model and main results
2.1 Setup
Our model economy is populated by an infinite sequence of generations whose
sizes are equal and normalized to unity. Each generation t = 0, 1, 2, ... is
characterized by the common utility function U , taking values U(ct, ct+1),
where ct is the total consumption of generation t. We assume U to be time-
separable3 and take the form: U(ct, ct+1) = u(ct)+v(ct+1). The consumption
set is Y = [0, Y¯ ] where Y¯ ∈ R+. The unique consumption good is produced
using technology f which requires two kinds of inputs: (i) time devoted to
work lˆt, and (ii) human capital ht. The set H = [0, H¯], where H¯ ∈ R+,
represents all possible levels of human capital. We assume away all physical
capital accumulation in our basic model. Human capital, on the other hand,
is accumulated using technology g˜ taking as inputs: (i) the current level of
human capital ht, and (ii) time devoted to human capital accumulation 1− lˆt.
Technically, our assumptions on the considered economy are the following:
Assumption 1 Let:
• u, v : Y → R be increasing, continuously differentiable, and satisfying
limc→0 u′(c) = limc→0 v′(c) = ∞; (∀c ∈ Y, c > 0) u′(c) < ∞ and
(∀c ∈ Y, c > 0) v′(c) < ∞. Moreover, let u and v be strictly concave
and such that u(0) = v(0) = 0,
• f : H × [0, 1] → Y be strictly concave with respect to the second ar-
gument, twice continuously differentiable with finite partial derivatives,
and satisfying (∀lˆ ∈ [0, 1]) f(0, lˆ) = 0, (∀h ∈ H) limlˆ→0 f ′2(h, lˆ) = ∞.
3We analyze the case of time-separable utility functions only because the monotone
methods used in Theorem 2 rely on this assumption heavily and because this assumption
has been extensively used in literature. The case of non-time separable utility functions
could also be analyzed nonetheless. This would require the use of results on mixed mono-
tone operators. See Guo, Cho, and Zhu (2004) and the applications in Reffett and Woz´ny
(2008).
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Furthermore, assume that (∀h ∈ (0, H¯]) f(h, ·) and (∀lˆ ∈ (0, 1]) f(·, lˆ)
are strictly increasing functions.
Within each generation, the household chooses its consumption level ct
to maximize utility U , that is:
max
ct
u(ct) + v(ct+1). (2.1)
Assuming out physical capital accumulation amounts to assuming full de-
preciation as well. All output is thus immediately consumed: ct = f(ht, lˆt),
where lˆt ∈ [0, 1]. Human capital is accumulated according to the equation:
ht+1 = g˜(ht, 1 − lˆt), where g˜ : H × [0, 1] is a continuous, strictly positive
function. Substituting the relations specified above into (2.1) and ignoring
time subscripts we obtain the following household maximization problem:
max
lˆ∈[0,1]
u(f(h, lˆ)) + v(f(g˜(h, 1− lˆ), l˜)). (2.2)
The problem (2.2) features two endogenously determined variables which are
taken as given by the original generation: their own human capital level
h ∈ H and the labor choice of the next generation l˜ ∈ [0, 1].
We propose two alternative economic interpretations for our modeling
approach summarized by the maximization problem (2.2):
• each household lives for one period and derives utility from its own
consumption, u(ct), and the consumption of its immediate successor,
v(ct+1);
• each household lives for two periods but chooses the fraction of time
devoted to the production of consumption goods and the fraction of
time devoted to the accumulation of human capital of the subsequent
generation in the first period only. Its consumption in the second period
is chosen by the next generation, and thus is only indirectly influenced
by the level of human capital left to the next generation.
2.2 The concept of Markov perfect equilibrium
The primary objective of this paper is to analyze closed-loop Markov perfect
equilibria (MPE) of the economy specified above. To this end, we must now
introduce some new notation. Namely, by l′ ∈ L, where L = {l : (0, H] →
[0, 1], l ∈ C }, we will denote the Markov strategy of the next generation.
Moreover, we shall let 0 ∈ L denote the constant zero function, and let
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1 ∈ L denote a constant function whose values are always equal to 1. We
shall also introduce the correspondence D : L×H → [0, 1] defined by
D(l′, h) = arg max
lˆ∈[0,1]
u(f(h, lˆ)) + v(f(g˜(h, 1− lˆ), l′(g˜(h, 1− lˆ)))). (2.3)
The best response of the current generation for next generation’s strategy
l′ ∈ L is therefore a selection l(·) from D(l′|·).
We adopt the following definition of MPE:
Definition 1 A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the economy is a se-
lection4 l∗ : (0, H¯] → [0, 1] from D(l∗|·).
The MPE can be interpreted either as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of an sequential intergenerational game or as a time-consistent policy which is
suited for each generation. Since the time horizon of the economy is infinite,
we concentrate on stationary Markov policies, i.e. such that in each period,
the same function of the state variable h is applied.5
2.3 Introducing stochastic transition
Unfortunately, as discussed by Leininger (1986) and others, the standard way
of obtaining results on the existence and uniqueness of MPE in similar setups
– as fixed points of some self maps – is obstructed by the so-called ”vicious
circle”of strategy space. The problem occurs when trying to construct appro-
priate sets of admissible strategies/policies. Even very strong assumptions
made on the strategy/policy of the subsequent generation cannot guarantee
that the best response to that strategy would belong the the same set of
strategies/policies.
The crucial step required to solve this problem is to break the determin-
istic links between subsequent generations/periods (see Amir, 1996c; Nowak,
2003). In our case, this would correspond to assuming that the transition (hu-
man capital accumulation function) g˜ be stochastic. We shall let G(·;h, 1− l)
be the distribution of human capital in the subsequent period, parametrized
by the current human capital level h and the time investment 1− l.
The introduction of stochastic factors in human capital accumulation is
thus motivated primarily by technical reasons. Such factors have sound eco-
nomic motivation, though. Indeed, (i) heredity involves randomness: the
4We are leaving l∗(0) undefined here, since under assumptions 1 and 2, as we shall show
later, it is not single-valued. The economic justification is the following: having no human
capital one produces, consumes and invests nothing but since there is a no disutility of
work, any level of l could be optimal.
5If the horizon of the economy were finite, we could solve for non-stationary policies by
backward induction.
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unobservable skill levels are not inherited from one’s parents deterministi-
cally; (ii) human capital is not homogenous: it is technology-specific and
thus up-front investment in it might (but might not) be ineffective (Chari
and Hopenhayn, 1991), depending on the future pattern of technological
progress; (iii) the motivation of children to learn is endogenous (Orazem
and Tesfatsion, 1997). All these factors taken together make it clear that
treating investment in education as a lottery where future payoffs depend on
stochastic factors is quite reasonable.6
The following assumption on the stochastic transition follows Amir (1996c)
and Nowak (2006).
Assumption 2 (Technology) The distribution G satisfies the following con-
ditions:
• ∀h ∈ H, G(0|h, 0) = 1,
• ∀h ∈ H, l ∈ [0, 1),
G(·|h, 1− l) = (1− g(h, 1− l))δ0(·) + g(h, 1− l)λ(·),
where
• g : H × [0, 1] → [0, 1] is strictly concave with respect to the sec-
ond argument, twice continuously differentiable, satisfies the condition:
(∀l ∈ [0, 1]), g(0, 1− l) = 0,
• (∀l ∈ [0, 1)) g(·, 1 − l) and (∀h ∈ (0, H¯]) g(h, ·) are strictly increasing
functions,
• (∀h ∈ H) liml→1 g′2(h, 1− l) = ∞ and (∀h ∈ H, l < 1), 0 < g′2(h, 1− l) <
∞,
• λ is a Borel transition probability on (0, H¯],
• δ0 is a probability measure concentrated at zero.
The crucial implications of this specification are as follows: with proba-
bility 1−g(h, 1−l), the next generation’s human capital will be zero, indicat-
ing that the investment in it has been completely ineffective. This relates to
the argument that skills be technology-specific, and that technology might
change fast enough to make all previously acquired skills obsolete. With
6It should be noted that we rule out all systematic human capital externalities from non-
relatives (Ben-Porath, 1967; Rangazas, 2000) and assume that children’s human capital is
created from parental human capital, education effort, and stochastic factors only.
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probability g(h, 1− l), however, human capital is drawn from a distribution
λ which does not depend on h or l. This relates to the stochastic heredity
assumption, coupled with the random motivation of children to learn.
Assuming that the next generation follows a Markov strategy l′ ∈ L, the
maximization problem (2.2) augmented by stochastic transition takes the
form:
max
lˆ∈[0,1]
u(f(h, lˆ)) +
∫
H
v(f(y, l′(y)))G(dy;h, 1− lˆ). (2.4)
Under assumptions 1 and 2, the maximand of (2.4) (for a given h ∈ (0, H¯])
is strictly concave and differentiable with respect to lˆ on (0, 1). Furthermore,
the unique optimal labor supply level l∗ solves ζ(l∗, h, l′) = 0 whenever inte-
rior, where ζ is defined as:
ζ(l, h, l′) := u′(f(h, l))f ′2(h, l)− g′2(h, 1− l)
∫
H
v(f(y, l′(y)))λ(dy). (2.5)
A MPE of the economy with stochastic transition is then a function l which
solves ζ(l(h), h, l) = 0 for all h ∈ (0, H¯].
2.4 Characteristics of the closed-loop MPE
Let us now comment on the possibilities of showing existence of a MPE in the
given class of functions. In a paper most closely related to this one, Reffett
and Woz´ny (2008) have constructed an operator whose fixed points are MPE
of an economy with intergenerational altruism (see also Bernheim and Ray
(1987)). The operator is defined implicitly on the set of Lipschitz continuous
functions belonging to L by an appropriate first order condition. The authors
find that it suffices to show continuity of such an operator, and existence of
a MPE follows by the Brouwer fixed point theorem. In our particular case,
however, their method fails due to the non-uniqueness of the maximizer in
equation (2.5) for h = 0. Specifically, for any l′ ∈ L the optimal l∗(0) ∈ [0, 1].
Notice also that (∀h ∈ H, h > 0), l∗(h) = 1 is the best response to l′ = 0.
Hence, we cannot apply those results directly. Fortunately, there exists a
way to circumvent this problem and we will present it below.
Before we actually prove the existence of a MPE, however, let us present
some of its basic properties. They will be helpful in our further analysis.
Theorem 1 (Characteristics of MPE) Suppose that a MPE exists.
Then:
• the set of Markov perfect equilibria of the economy has no ordered (in
a pointwise order) elements in L.
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• If f ′′12(·, ·) ≤ 0 and g′′12(·, ·) ≥ 0, then l∗ is strictly decreasing on (0, H¯)
wherever interior.
The first assertion results from the fact that an operator defined on the
first order conditions whose fixed points are MPE of the economy is de-
creasing. The second assertion follows from established theorems on strict
monotone comparative statics (Amir (1996b); Edlin and Shannon (1998)) of
optimal solutions to maximization problems featuring a submodular function
on a lattice. Please observe that the reverse to the second assertion does not
have to hold. Generally, even if f ′′12(·, ·) ≥ 0 and g′′12(·, ·) ≤ 0, the optimal
labor supply policy l∗ does not need to increase with h due to the strictly
decreasing marginal utility.
2.5 The main result: Existence and uniqueness
To state our main results on existence and uniqueness, we have to rearrange
the first order condition of maximization in (2.4) for h ∈ (0, H¯]:
ξh(lˆ) :=
u′(f(h, lˆ))f ′2(h, lˆ)
g′2(h, 1− lˆ)
=
∫
H
v(f(y, l(y)))λ(dy). (2.6)
The function ξh(0, 1] → R+, with ξh(1) = 0, introduced just above, captures
the marginal utility of consumption coupled with marginal labor productivi-
ties in both sectors. Using this function, we can substitute the MPE condition
specified in the previous subsection with the following functional equation:
ξh(l(h)) =
∫
H
v(f(y, l(y)))λ(dy). (2.7)
The next lemma summarizes the main properties of function ξh.
Lemma 1 For all h ∈ (0, H¯] the function ξh : (0, 1] → R+ is continuously
differentiable, strictly decreasing, and invertible with continuously differen-
tiable inverse. The inverse function ξ−1h : R+ → (0, 1) is in addition strictly
decreasing.
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly to the method used in Coleman (2000), let us now consider the
functional equation:
l¯(h) =
∫
H
v(f(y, ξ−1h (l¯(y))))λ(dy). (2.8)
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The great usefulness of equation (2.8) stems from the fact that any function
l ∈ L is a solution to the functional equation (2.7) if and only if l¯ : (0, H¯] →
[0,∞) defined by l¯(y) := ξh(l(y)) is a solution to (2.8).
Let us also define an operator B on P = {l¯ : (0, H¯] → [0,∞)} such that
for any h ∈ (0, H¯], B satisfies:
Bl¯(h) =
∫
H
v(f(y, ξ−1h (l¯(y))))λ(dy). (2.9)
Furthermore, by Efx we will denote the elasticity of a single-variable function
f , measured in point x in its domain.
The next theorem gives the conditions under which B has a unique fixed
point in P . This finding is equivalent to showing under which conditions the
MPE of the considered economy exists and is unique.
Theorem 2 (Existence and uniqueness) Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be sat-
isfied. Assume in addition that (∃r, 0 < r < 1) such that (∀h ∈ H) the
following holds:
(∀h ∈ (0, H¯])(∀x > 0) r ≥
[
−Evf(h,ξ−1(x))Ef,2ξ−1(x)Eξ
−1
x
]
. (2.10)
Then B has a unique fixed point l¯∗ in P ◦ and repeated iteration of B from
any p0 ∈ P ◦ assures uniform convergence to l¯∗ (that is, the condition (7.28)
holds).
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 2 is probably the most important result in this paper. It gives
us sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a fixed point of
an operator B (and hence, of a MPE of the considered economy) and allows
to compute it using a straightforward iterative procedure. Having calculated
the unique fixed point l¯∗ of the operator B in P , we can pin down the unique
MPE of the analyzed economy by l∗(y) = ξ−1h (l¯
∗(y)).
The mathematical intuition behind Theorem 2 is the following: since
the operator B is decreasing, it may have multiple, unordered fixed points.
The condition in Theorem 2 asserts, however, that this operator is “convex”
(see Guo and Lakshmikantham (1988) for details) or – in other words – is a
“local contraction”. This property is sufficient for existence of a unique fixed
point. Economically, the condition (2.10) (“convexity” or “local contraction”)
could be interpreted in terms of partial elasticities: it requires that the prod-
uct of elasticities of v, f and ξ−1 cannot exceed unity, i.e. that the percentage
change in next-period utility v resulting from a one per-cent change in labor
supply l cannot be “too high”. Otherwise, it could be profitable to deviate
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from the given policy – the loss in instantaneous consumption sub-utility u
would be more than compensated by the gain in next-period consumption
sub-utility v – indicating that the given policy could not be an equilibrium
any more.
We leave the questions on existence and number of equilibria when con-
dition (2.10) is not satisfied for further work. Instead, we shall now present
our workhorse example which will be used in subsequent numerical exercises.
Example 1 Let U(c1, c2) = c
γ1
1 + δc
γ2
2 , f(h, l) = h
α1lβ1. Furthermore, take
any g satisfying Assumption 2 with α1, β1, γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1]. If
1 > β1(γ1 + γ2) then there exists a unique MPE in L.
Proof of Example 1: Observe that is this case elasticities of the utilities u
and v as well as f are constant. Hence we may apply the Guo, Cho, and Zhu
(2004) theorem (see Theorem 4 in the Appendix) directly to the (decreas-
ing) operator B which can be calculated explicitly for the given functions.
3 Human capital dynamics with and without
strategic interactions
The theoretical results presented above will now be compared to the results
obtained within similar setups which do not allow for strategic interactions
between generations. Specifically, we shall focus on two of such models:
• a Ramsey-type model where generations do not derive utility directly
from their successors’ consumption, but from their utility. The utility
function is assumed to be constant across generations with a discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, all generations’ choices can be embedded
in the first generation’s optimization problem, ultimately yielding a
“dynastic” model with infinite-horizon planning where each generation
t maximizes
∑∞
τ=t δ
τ−tu(cτ ).7 Observe that such a setup rules out all
strategic aspects of the decision process.
• a model of “joy-of-giving” altruism where generations do not derive
utility directly from their successors’ consumption, but are instead in-
terested in providing them with the means allowing for consumption.
7Provided that the transversality condition holds: limτ→∞ Λτhτ = 0 (where Λ is the
shadow price of human capital). If the set of admissible human capital levels H is bounded,
as it is in our case, this transversality condition holds for sure.
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In the context of human capital accumulation it means that their util-
ity function is u(ct) + v(ht+1). Hence, the decisions made by the next
generation do not matter for the utility of the current generation.
3.1 Dynastic optimization
Consider an economy populated by a sequence of generations each repre-
sented by a single household with preferences U(ct, Vt+1) over its consumption
ct and its immediate descendants’ utility Vt+1. Since all generations’ utility
functions are the same, their choices can be embedded in the first genera-
tion’s optimization problem. The solution to this maximization problem cor-
responds to a stationary solution to an infinite-horizon Ramsey-type model
with stochastic transition in human capital levels: max{cτ}
∑∞
τ=t δ
τ−tu(cτ ),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
The first order condition reads:
u′(f(h, l(h)))f ′2(h, l(h)) = δg
′
2(h, 1− l(h))
∫
H
V (y)λ(dy), (3.11)
where V (h) is the Bellman’s value function defined as
V (h) = max
lˆ∈[0,1]
{
u(f(h, lˆ)) + δ
∫
H
V (y)G(dy;h, 1− lˆ)
}
. (3.12)
Standard arguments of dynamic programming (Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott
(1989)) guarantee that under our assumptions the functional equation (3.12)
has a unique solution V and that the solution to the Ramsey-type op-
timization problem corresponds to a function l(h) which solves V (h) =
u(f(h, l(h))) + δ
∫
H
V (y)G(dy, h, 1− l(h)).
The first order condition (3.11) guarantees that the marginal utility of
consumption of the current generation, acquired thanks to an extra unit of
time devoted to work, is exactly equal to the expected marginal cost in terms
of utility lost by the next generation because of having marginally less human
capital.
Note that such a setup rules out all strategic aspects of the decision
process and therefore the (full-commitment) Markov policy for a dynastic
optimization economy is (generally) not a MPE of an economy with strategic
interactions.
3.2 Joy-of-giving altruism
The model with joy-of-giving altruism (and, to guarantee direct compara-
bility, with a stochastic transition in human capital levels) can be generally
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specified as:
max
lˆ∈[0,1]
u(f(h, lˆ)) +
∫
H
v(y)G(dy;h, 1− lˆ). (3.13)
Concentrating on Markovian policies, the first order condition for optimal
labor supply l(h) is given by:
u′(f(h, l(h)))f ′2(h, l(h)) = g
′
2(h, 1− l(h))
∫
H
v(y)λ(dy), (3.14)
guaranteeing that the marginal utility of consumption acquired thanks to an
extra unit of time devoted to work is exactly equal to the expected marginal
cost in terms of lost human capital of the next generation.
3.3 Comparing equilibrium policies
It turns out that equilibrium policies for our basic model with strategic in-
teractions and for the Ramsey-type dynastic optimization model economy
abstracting from such interactions can be directly compared:
Theorem 3 (On comparing equilibria) Let lMPE be a MPE of an econ-
omy with strategic interactions with v(·) = δu(·), and lR be the optimal sta-
tionary policy of a dynastic economy with utility u. Then lMPE(h) > lR(h)
for all h ∈ (0, H¯].
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 3 asserts that equilibrium human capital investment is unam-
biguously lower in an economy with strategic interactions than in a economy
with dynastic optimization. The intuition behind this result is straightfor-
ward: the optimal investment policy under full commitment must exceed
the equilibrium investment policy when only partial commitment between
consecutive generations is possible. Indeed, in the Ramsey-type model, the
dynastic head from generation t will take into account not only the consump-
tion of the following generation t + 1, but of all generations from t onwards.
She will therefore be willing to save more for the future than a generation
t member of the strategic model: the latter person is myopic and wishes to
save for her children but not for her grandchildren.
Theorem 3 is the second main result in this paper. It provides a formal ar-
gument determining the direction of the bias incurred when a baseline model
with strategic interactions is replaced with its non-strategic counterpart.
Unfortunately, a similar clear-cut relationship does not exist between the
strategic model and the model with joy-of-giving altruism. As will be shown
in a numerical example in the following section, equilibrium policies of those
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two setups cannot be unambiguously compared. Even though each of them
has been prepared so that direct comparisons could be possible, we find that
for different parameter configurations, different results are possible. Usually
it is the strategic model which puts more weight on immediate consumption
and less on human capital accumulation; sometimes the result is reversed,
though.
4 Numerical example
4.1 Numerical computation of the MPE
The objective of the current section is to compute numerically the equilib-
rium policy l∗ for an economy with strategic interactions and to analyze
the equilibrium dynamics of human capital accumulation given certain func-
tional assumptions on u, v, f and G. To facilitate economic interpretation,
we will concentrate on iso-elastic utility and Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions here. We will then benchmark these numerical results against the cor-
responding ones obtained for non-strategic models discussed in the previous
section.
Example 2 Extending Example 1, let us additionally assume that g(h, 1 −
l) = 1
H¯α2
hα2(1− l)β2 where α2, β2 ∈ (0, 1). The function ξh is then given by:
ξh(l) =
β1γ1
β2
H¯α2hα1γ1−α2
lβ1γ1−1
(1− l)β2−1 . (4.15)
Furthermore, we assume that β2 = β1γ1.
The last equality assumption has been made for the sole purpose of an-
alytical tractability: it is only when β2 = β1γ1 that the ξh mapping is ana-
lytically invertible. Relaxing it increases the computational burden but does
not overturn any of our results. If β2 = β1γ1, we obtain:
ξ−1h (l¯) =
l¯
1
β2−1h
α1γ1−α2
1−β2 H¯
α2
1−β2
1 + l¯
1
β2−1h
α1γ1−α2
1−β2 H¯
α2
1−β2
. (4.16)
Assuming furthermore that the distribution λ is uniform on H, the MPE
policy can be found as l∗(y) = ξ−1h (l¯(y)) where l¯ is found as the fixed point
of the operator B given by
Bl¯(h) =
δ
H¯
∫ H¯
0
yα1γ2
(
l¯(y)
1
β2−1h
α1γ1−α2
1−β2 H¯
α2
1−β2
1 + l¯(y)
1
β2−1h
α1γ1−α2
1−β2 H¯
α2
1−β2
)β1γ2
dy. (4.17)
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As stated in Theorem 2, repeated iteration of B guarantees convergence to
the MPE (see Figure 1).8
Proposition 1 The MPE policy l∗ is monotone. It is everywhere decreasing
iff α1γ1 < α2, everywhere increasing iff α1γ1 > α2, and constant iff α1γ1 =
α2.
Proof of Proposition 1: In equilibrium, l¯(h) = ξh(l(h)) can by defined as
the right-hand side of (4.17).
We will now differentiate l(h) = ξ−1h (l¯(h)) with respect to h. Observe
that it is justified since lemma 1 states that ξ−1h is differentiable while from
equations (4.16) and (4.17) we also have that functions ηz (where, for given
z ∈ [0,∞), ηz(h) := ξ−1h (z)) and l¯ are differentiable with respect to h on
(0, H¯). It is obtained that:
dl(h)
dh
=
∂ξ−1h (l¯(h))
∂l¯(h)
∂l¯(h)
∂h
+
∂ξ−1h (l¯(h))
∂h
=
=
1
(1 + Ξ(h))2
(
l(h)
1
β2−1h
α1γ1−α2
1−β1 −1
1− β2
)
(α1γ1 − α2)× (4.18)
×
1− β1γ21−β2 δH¯
∫ H¯
0
yα1γ2
(
Ξ(y)
1+Ξ(y)
)β1γ2
1
1+Ξ(y)
dy
δ
H¯
∫ H¯
0
yα1γ2
(
Ξ(y)
1+Ξ(y)
)β1γ2
dy
 ,
with Ξ(y) ≡ l¯(y) 1β2−1h
α1γ1−α2
1−β2 H¯
α2
1−β2 . Since β1γ1 = β2, and by assumption,
1 > β1(γ1 + γ2), it follows that
β1γ2
1−β2 < 1 and thus the ratio of two integrals
in the last parenthesis is smaller than one, we find the expression in the last
parenthesis to be positive. In conclusion, dl(h)
dh
> 0 and thus l(h) is increasing
in its domain iff α1γ1 > α2,
dl(h)
dh
< 0 and thus l(h) is decreasing in its domain
iff α1γ1 < α2, and l(h) is constant iff α1γ1 = α2.
Having specified the three cases in which the optimal labor supply policy
is increasing, decreasing, or constant in the human capital endowment, let
us discuss the empirical plausibility of each of the cases. The results are
somewhat reassuring here. Namely, the case where α2 > α1γ1, guaranteed
8To calculate the equilibrium policies of any of the three models numerically, we have
used the discretization method discussed by Judd (1998). MATLAB codes used to compute
the numerical results quoted throughout the paper as well as to produce Table 1 are
available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1: Convergence to the fixed point of operator B. The fixed point is
the auxilliary policy function l¯(h) = ξh(l(h)). Assumed parameter values:
α1 = .3; β1 = .7;α2 = .3; γ1 = .6; γ2 = .5; β2 = β1γ1 = .42; H¯ = 100; δ = .9.
to hold e.g. if α1 ≈ α2 (i.e. if the shares of human capital in production of
the consumption good and of human capital, respectively, are approximately
equal), turns out to be significantly more plausible empirically than any of
the other cases.9 This case, implying that labor supply decreases (and human
capital accumulation increases) with the stock of human capital, is thus going
to be our benchmark case.
4.2 Dynamics
The dynamic properties of the economy are as follows. If all generations play
the MPE strategy, then in the limit as t→∞, average human capital tends
9Becker and Tomes (1986), Lochner (2008), among numerous others, discuss the em-
pirical evidence that the educational effort and children’s school attainments are unam-
biguously positively related to the parental human capital level.
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to h¯ solving the implicit equation:
h¯ = 2
1
α2−1 H¯(1− l(h¯))
β2
1−α2 . (4.19)
This result has been confirmed numerically.10
The distribution of human capital will also evolve over time as consecutive
generations will invest different fractions of time to work and education. By
definition, however, the distribution of human capital over H will have a
constant density 1
H¯
g(h¯, 1 − l(h¯)) = 1
H¯α2+1
h¯α2(1 − l(h¯))β2 and a probability
mass 1− g(h¯, 1− l(h¯)) = 1− 1
H¯α2
h¯α2(1− l(h¯))β2 concentrated at zero.
4.3 Role of the transition distribution λ
The MPE policy l∗(h) depends on the underlying transition distribution λ
but this impact turns out to be rather modest. As a robustness check of our
earlier numerical results, we have substituted the uniform distribution λ with
two alternatives:
• a triangular distribution with density
ϕ(h) =
{
4
H¯2
h, h ∈ (0, H¯
2
),
4
H¯
− 4
H¯2
h, h ∈ ( H¯
2
, H¯);
(4.20)
• a one-point distribution11 with all probability mass concentrated in
H¯/2: P (h = H¯/2) = 1.
As we have confirmed numerically,12 the greatest labor supply is obtained
when the distribution is uniform, and the least labor is supplied when the
probability mass is concentrated at the mean human capital level. The pol-
icy for the triangular distribution falls in between these two extreme cases
(uniform and one-point). The interpretation of this result is straightforward:
the more risk remains that human capital of the successive generation would
be low despite substantial investment, the less willing the decision maker
would be to invest in human capital. Since individuals are risk-averse in
this model, additional risk lowers education effort and increases labor supply
which guarantees a certain payoff.
10The results are available from the authors upon request.
11Note that even when λ is one-point, there remains a probability that the next gen-
eration’s human capital will be zero. Hence, the assumptions and interpretations of the
economy with strategic interactions studied in Section 2 are still satisfied.
12These results are available from the authors upon request.
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5 Numerical assessment of the role of strate-
gic interactions
Let us now compare the equilibrium dynamics obtained in the numerical
example presented above to the ones generated by a Ramsey-type dynastic
model as well as by a model with “joy-of-giving” altruism. In both of these
alternatives, no strategic intergenerational interactions are present.
Example 3 (Dynastic optimization) Let u(c) = cγ, f(h, l) = hα3lβ3,
g(h, 1 − l) = 1
H¯α4
hα4(1 − l)β4. Let the decision maker born at t maximize
u(ct) + δu(ct+1). From (3.11), we obtain the first order condition for the op-
timal policy function l(h). It is given as an implicit solution to the equation:
l1−β3γ
(1− l)1−β4 =
H¯α4
δI
hα3γ−α4 , (5.21)
where I ≡ ∫
H
V (y)λ(dy) is a predetermined constant.
Using the implicit function theorem, it can again be easily shown that
l(h) is everywhere decreasing whenever α4 > α3γ and everywhere increasing
whenever α4 < α3γ. In the special case where α3γ = α4, (5.21) implies
that l(h) is constant, independent of h. This finding paralells Proposition 1
precisely: there are absolutely no qualitative differences in the optimal policy
behavior between the strategic and the non-strategic model. Quantitative
differences are substantial, though, as we shall see shortly.
Moreover, just like in the strategic case, the first order condition (5.21)
can be solved for l∗(h) explicitly in the special case β3γ = β4. In such case,
l∗(h) =
(
H¯α4
δI
) 1
1−β4 h
α3γ−α4
1−β4
1 +
(
H¯α4
δI
) 1
1−β4 h
α3γ−α4
1−β4
. (5.22)
What remains to be derived is the constant I =
∫
H
V (y)λ(dy). It can be
found as an implicit solution of the following equation:
I =
∫
H
yα3γl∗(y)β1γλ(dy)
1− δ ∫
H
(
y
H¯
)α4 (1− l∗(y))β4λ(dy) , (5.23)
with l∗ defined as in (5.22) and thus containing I. The approximate solu-
tion to this equation can be easily computed numerically. Please note that
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knowing I, we can also obtain an explicit formula for the value function:
V (h) = hα3γl∗(h)β3γ + (5.24)
+
(
δ
∫
H
yα3γl∗(y)β1γλ(dy)
1− δ ∫
H
(
y
H¯
)α4 (1− l∗(y))β4λ(dy)
)(
h
H¯
)α4
(1− l∗(h))β4 .
The direct computation of I would not have been possible if not for the in-
troduction of stochastic transition in human capital levels. Thanks to that
step, the infinite series expansion of V (h) can be computed as a simple geo-
metric series which has a closed-form sum. It also enables us to use the law
of iterated expectations to convert an n-tuple integral into a product of n
simple integrals.
Example 4 (Joy-of-giving altruism) Let u(c) = cγ5, v(h′) = (h′)γ6,
f(h, l) = hα5lβ5, g(h, 1 − l) = 1
H¯α6
hα6(1 − l)β6. From (3.14), we obtain the
first order condition for the optimal policy l(h). It is given as an implicit
solution to the equation:
l1−β5γ5
(1− l)1−β6 =
β5γ5
δβ6
(1 + γ6)H¯
α6−γ6hα5γ5−α6 . (5.25)
Using the implicit function theorem, it is straightforward to show that
l(h) is everywhere decreasing whenever α6 > α5γ5 and everywhere increasing
whenever α6 < α5γ5. In the special case where α3γ3 = α4, (5.25) implies that
l(h) is constant, independent of h. This finding is crucial here because it is an
exact analogue to Proposition 1 and an equivalent proposition which holds for
the dynastic model: whenever the MPE labor supply policy of the model with
strategic interactions is decreasing/increasing, it is also decreasing/increasing
in both alternative models.
Just like in Example 2, the above equation (5.25) can be solved for l∗(h)
explicitly in the special case β5γ5 = β6. In such case,
l∗(h) =
(
γ6+1
δ
) 1
1−β6 H¯
α6−γ6
1−β6 h
α5γ5−α6
1−β6
1 +
(
γ6+1
δ
) 1
1−β6 H¯
α6−γ6
1−β6 h
α5γ5−α6
1−β6
. (5.26)
We are now in the position to compare the equilibrium labor supply policy
function derived from the model with strategic intergenerational interactions
with the two alternative non-strategic scenarios. To attain direct compara-
bility of all three setups, we must assure γ = γ1 = γ2 = γ5 = γ6/β1 – in the
dynastic model, the shape parameters of utility functions u and v must be
equal while for the joy-of-giving altruism model, one has to impose γ6 = β1γ2
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Figure 2: The difference between equilibrium policy functions l∗(h) in the
baseline model, compared with the Ramsey-type model and the model with
joy-of-giving altruism. Assumed parameter values: α1 = .3; β1 = .7;α2 =
.3; γ = .6; β2 = β1γ1 = .42; H¯ = 100; δ = .9.
in order to equalize the elasticities of h′ in both utility functions. We shall
also fix our other parameters at equal levels, α1 = α3 = α5, β1 = β3 =
β5, α2 = α4 = α6, β2 = β4 = β6.
The results are apparent in Figure 2. Most labor is supplied (and thus,
least human capital is accumulated) in the case of the MPE policy in our
baseline model with strategic interactions between subsequent generations,
the second position is taken by the Ramsey-type model with dynastic op-
timization while the last position obtains to the model with joy-of-giving
altruism.
While the ordering of the strategic model and the Ramsey-type dynas-
tic model is certain (by Theorem 3, labor supply is always greater in the
strategic model than in the dynastic model), the joy-of-giving model cannot
be unambiguously ranked and thus the result presented in Figure 2 is not
completely generic. There exist certain cases (though arguably unusual) in
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which joy-of-giving altruism could give rise to less human capital accumula-
tion (and more labor supply) than dynastic optimization, possibly even more
than the strategic intergenerational game.
Furthermore, even though there is a marked difference in the levels of
human capital investment between the models, the shapes of the three policy
functions are remarkably similar. With iso-elastic utility and Cobb-Douglas
production functions, and under our benchmark parametrization, labor sup-
ply functions l∗(h) always decrease with h, indicating that human capital and
education effort are positively related, in line with empirical observations (e.g.
Becker and Tomes (1986)).
5.1 Equilibrium investment in human capital: an in-
terpretation
The uniform ordering of labor supply functions obtained from the three mod-
els under consideration (the policy curves such as the ones depicted in Figure
2 never intersect) offers an intuitive and convincing explanation. In simple
words: the more directly does child’s human capital enter parent’s utility
function, the more willing will she be to invest in it. With joy-of-giving al-
truism, utility is derived from child’s human capital directly; consequently,
investment in human capital will be the highest in such case, unless β1 and
β2 are very low, indicating that current production as well as human capital
accumulation react to changes in labor supply with a small elasticity. The
rationale is that with strategic interactions, utility acquired from second pe-
riod consumption is conditional on the strategy chosen by the subsequent
generation while with joy-of-giving altruism, it is certain. Bernheim and Ray
(1987) identify, however, another force at work here: since in the strategic
model, each generation views the investment made by their children, (1− l′),
as pure waste, it must invest more to obtain the same effect (compared to
the joy-of-giving altruism model where investment in grandchildren is not
thought of as waste). The latter force turns out to have a relatively smaller
impact on our results in the benchmark parametrization, but it could become
dominant if β’s are sufficiently small.
With dynastic optimization, utility is derived from children’s utility which
is a function of their human capital. In such case, the parents know exactly
what would eventually be optimal for their children; because of that knowl-
edge, they can anticipate their children’s choices and solve for the social plan-
ner’s first best which involves substantial human capital investment (once you
care for your children’s utility, you also care for your grandchildren’s, great-
grandchildren’s, etc.). Perfect anticipation across generations is not possible
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in our baseline model with intergenerational interactions, though. In such a
model, utility is derived from children’s consumption which is decided endoge-
nously by them in a process of utility maximization which takes into account
also the grandchildren’s consumption, for which the original generation does
not care. This gives one more intermediate step of embeddedness: human
capital → children’s utility → children’s consumption. In result, the interest
in investing in children’s human capital is the least under this scenario. The
unambiguous ordering of the strategic and the dynastic model, proved for-
mally in Theorem 3, leads to the conclusion that strategic interactions across
generations are an important source of underinvestment in human capital as
compared to the intergenerational first best.13
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In order to obtain a rough approximation of the magnitude of difference be-
tween equilibrium policies in the three considered models, we have carried out
a numerical sensitivity analysis exercise: we have manipulated the parame-
ters of the three models under study and compared the resultant equilibrium
policy functions l∗(h). For each parameter configuration, we calculated four
measures of distance between the three functions. Since our initial presump-
tion was that in principle, lMPE > lR > lJOG (where MPE stands for the
Markov perfect equilibrium of our baseline strategic model, R stands for
“Ramsey”, i.e. the model featuring dynastic optimization, and JOG denotes
joy-of-giving altruism), our proposed distance measures have been defined as
follows:
1. The area between lMPE and lR: D1 =
∫
H
(lMPE(h)− lR(h))dh.
2. The area between lR and lJOG: D2 =
∫
H
(lR(h) − lJOG(h))dh. In the
case this integral is negative, it follows that lJOG(h) > lR(h) for all
h ∈ H (policy functions never intersect). If it is negative and D1+D2 =∫
H
(lMPE(h) − lJOG(h))dh < 0, it is also true that lJOG(h) > lMPE(h)
for all h ∈ H.
3. The minimum distance between lMPE and lR:
D3 = infh∈H |lMPE(h)− lR(h)|.
4. The minimum distance between lR and lJOG:
D4 = infh∈H |lR(h)− lJOG(h)|.
13This is of course just an intuitive argument, not a formal statement: no meaningful
welfare comparisons can be made when welfare is measured differently across cases.
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One crucial finding which facilitates the subsequent analysis and justifies the
above definitions is that the policy functions never intersect.
For simplicity of computations, we have maintained the assumption β2 =
β1γ1; for comparability of our results, we have also retained the condition
γ1 = γ2. This limits the scope of this sensitivity analysis exercise markedly,
but our intention was not to search through the whole parameter space any-
way. Even under these restrictions, we find both important departures from
the baseline parametrization illustrated in Figure 2 and potentially large dis-
tances between the three policy functions.
First of all, our numerical exercise confirms that equilibrium policy func-
tions l∗ from different models indeed never intersect (D3, D4 > 0). Their
benchmark ordering (lMPE > lR > lJOG) is not robust across all cases, how-
ever. In the cases where β’s are very low, joy-of-giving altruism has less hu-
man capital investment in equilibrium than any other case (lJOG > lMPE >
lR), and when they are slightly greater, we get lMPE > lJOG > lR. This result
has to deal with the strategic effect described by Bernheim and Ray (1987)
– in our baseline model, each generation views the investment made by their
children as pure waste and thus it must invest more to obtain the same utility
gains – outweighing the direct effect of giving more when the joy is in giv-
ing itself. Indeed, when β’s are low, human capital investment is inefficient,
and thus in the baseline model, any investment in grandchildren must look
like enormous waste. In the Ramsey-type model, on the other hand, greater
investment in human capital is necessary to counteract the very low returns
to human capital accumulation so that further generations of the dynasty
would still get access to non-negligible utility levels: u′(c) → +∞ as c→ 0.
The numerical results on the ordering of policy functions obtained from
the strategic model and from the Ramsey-type model (lMPE > lR) are,
of course, consistent with implications of Theorem 3. The distance be-
tween these two policy functions can vary considerably, though: under some
parametrizations (such as the baseline parametrization), it is large, while
under others, in particular those involving radically low δ’s, it may even be
close to zero.
The results of our sensitivity analysis exercise have been summarized in
Table 1. The baseline parametrization is: α1 = 0.3; β1 = 0.7;α2 = 0.3; γ =
0.6; β2 = β1γ1 = 0.42; H¯ = 100; δ = 0.9, just like in the previous section. Un-
less indicated otherwise, these parameter choices are maintained throughout
the table.
In conclusion, when comparing the joy-of-giving altruism model against
any of the two other models, parametrization matters. Moreover, for quan-
titative results, parametrization matters a lot as well.
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Case D1 D2 D3 D4
Close to Baseline
Baseline 23.7462 28.1911 0.1353 0.2624
β1 = 0.5 25.9257 0.2803 0.1884 0.0027
α1 = 0.6 24.2728 3.8213 0.2336 0.0335
α1 = α2 = 0.6 13.0828 10.3587 0.0215 0.0292
α2 = 0.6 13.2903 35.1804 0.0043 0.0430
β1 = 0.6; γ = 0.8 22.3790 36.1964 0.1617 0.3471
lMPE ≈ lR: low δ
α1 = α2 = 0.6; δ = 0.6 4.0759 22.5245 0.0044 0.0469
α1 = α2 = 0.6; δ = 0.3 0.4628 25.7418 0.0004 0.0416
δ = 0.6 7.7896 50.7985 0.0296 0.4245
β1 = 0.6.γ = 0.8; δ = 0.6 6.4581 60.0304 0.0361 0.5829
δ = 0.3 0.9392 61.0867 0.0026 0.4023
β1 = 0.6; γ = 0.8; δ = 0.3 0.5958 70.7015 0.0027 0.6077
lMPE > lJOG > lR
β1 = 0.25 27.4195 -26.5800 0.2481 0.2482
β1 = 0.4; γ = 0.8 25.7481 -3.2412 0.2237 0.0320
β1 = 0.45 25.7630 -0.2971 0.2044 0.0029
lJOG > lMPE > lR
β1 = 0.1, γ = 0.8 28.1443 -40.7932 0.2770 0.3888
β1 = 0.1;α1 = α2 = 0.6 19.3906 -39.0093 0.1091 0.1863
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis results.
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6 Conclusion
The purpose of the current paper has been to accomplish the two principal
tasks: (i) to show how a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) policy function
can be computed in a model with fully-specified intergenerational interactions
in human capital accumulation, within an otherwise standard overlapping-
generations framework; (ii) to compare the outcomes of the strategic model
with two benchmark models which assume away intergenerational interac-
tions. To this end, we have proven analytically that when compared to a
model with dynastic optimization, our strategic model predicts unambigu-
ously lower equilibrium investment in human capital accumulation. When
compared to a model with joy-of-giving altruism, the results are ambiguous
(though with a tentative indication towards the strategic model having less
human capital accumulation as well).
We believe that finding a constructive algorithm for computing MPE poli-
cies in models of intergenerational altruism is a significant step forward in
modeling strategic linkages across generations. In this paper, we have shown
that this novel tool, developed by Reffett and Woz´ny (2008), can be gener-
alized to capture intergenerational linkages in human capital accumulation.
We have shown under which conditions the MPE policy exists and is unique,
we have proven its monotonicity, and also presented a workhorse example
for which most calculations could be done analytically, and for which the
numerical convergence of our iterative procedure to the MPE is quick and
easy.
We have also presented the conditions under which the MPE labor sup-
ply policy is increasing or decreasing. These conditions are the same for
our strategic model, a model with joy-of-giving altruism, and a Ramsey-type
model with dynastic optimization. Under a wide spectrum of “reasonable”
parametrizations, all three models predict the equilibrium labor supply func-
tion to decrease with human capital levels.
What remains to be done is, first and foremost, a generalization of the
constructive algorithm for computing MPE policies into higher dimensions.
This is enforced by the fact that most economic models featuring intergener-
ational altruism are set up with multiple choice and state variables. Another
issue which ought to be dealt with is the generalization of the stochastic tran-
sition function which was admittedly simplified in the current paper. We feel
that these two steps are necessary in order to bring models with strategic in-
teractions in human capital accumulation to the level of sophistication which
is now common with models lacking such strategic interactions.
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7 Appendix
Definition 2 Let E be a real Banach space and P ⊆ E be a nonempty,
closed, convex set. Then:
• P is called a cone if it satisfies two conditions: (i) x ∈ P,  > 0 ⇒ x ∈
P and (ii) x ∈ P,−x ∈ P ⇒ x = θ, where θ is a zero element of P ,
• suppose P is a cone in E and P ◦ 6= ∅, where P ◦ denotes the set of
interior points of P , we say that P is a solid cone,
• every cone P in E defines an order relation ≤ in E as follows:
x ≤ y if y − x ∈ P,
• a cone P is said to be normal if there exists a constant N > 0 such
that:
(∀x, y ∈ P ) θ ≤ x ≤ y ⇒ ‖x‖ ≤ N‖y‖.
Theorem 4 (Guo, Cho, and Zhu (2004)) Let P be a normal solid cone
in a real Banach space with partial ordering ≤ and B : P → P be a decreasing
operator (i.e. if l1 < l2 ∈ P then Bl2 ≤ Bl1) satisfying:
(∃r, 0 < r < 1)(∀l ∈ P ◦), (∀t, 0 < t < 1) trB(tl) ≤ Bl, (7.27)
then B has a unique fixed point in P ◦ and the following holds:
(∀l0 ∈ P ◦) lim
n→∞
‖ln − l∗‖ → 0, (7.28)
where (∀n ≥ 1) ln = B(ln−1).
Proof of Theorem 1: Define an operator A : L→ L in the following way:
(∀h ∈ (0, H¯]) A0(h) = 1
(∀l ∈ L, l 6= 0)(∀h ∈ (0, H¯]) ζ(Al(h), h, l) = 0, (7.29)
and observe that the MPE of the economy are the fixed points of A on L.
Note that under Assumptions 1 and 2, operator A is well-defined.
Let us first show by contradiction that A is strictly decreasing, i.e. (∀l1, l2 ∈
L) with (∀h ∈ (0, H¯]) l2(h) > l1(h) we have (∀h ∈ (0, H¯])Al1(h) > Al2(h).
Let l1, l2 ∈ L with (∀h ∈ (0, H¯]) l2(h) > l1(h) and suppose that (∃h˜ ∈
(0, H¯]) such that Al2(h˜) ≥ Al1(h˜). We consider two cases: l1 6= 0 and l1 = 0.
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Let us start with the former one. By definition of Al1 and monotonicity of ζ
we get for the given h˜:
0 = u′(f(h˜, Al1(h˜)))f ′2(h˜, Al1(h˜))− g′2(h˜, 1− Al1(h˜))
∫
H
v(f(y, l1(y)))λ(dy) >
u′(f(h˜, Al1(h˜)))f ′2(h˜, Al1(h˜))− g′2(h˜, 1− Al1(h˜))
∫
H
v(f(y, l2(y)))λ(dy) ≥
u′(f(h˜, Al2(h˜)))f ′2(h˜, Al2(h˜))− g′2(h˜, 1− Al2(h˜))
∫
H
v(f(y, l2(y)))λ(dy),
which is a contradiction to the definition of Al2 at h˜ ∈ (0, H¯]. If l1 = 0 then
by definition and hypothesis 1 = Al1(h˜) ≤ Al2(h˜) = 1. This contradicts the
observation that (∀h ∈ (0, H¯])Al2(h) < 1 when l2 6= 0 resulting from the
Inada conditions stated in Assumption 2. We conclude therefore that A is
strictly decreasing.
Suppose now that A has two ordered fixed points in L i.e. (∀h ∈ (0, H¯]),
l2(x) ≥ l1(x) and (∃h˜ ∈ (0, H¯]) such that l2(h˜) > l1(h˜). From the fixed point
property at h˜ we get Al2(h˜) = l2(h˜) > l1(h˜) = Al1(h˜), which contradicts that
A is strictly decreasing. Hence the set of fixed points of A, i.e. the set of the
MPE of the economy, has no ordered elements.
The second statement of the theorem follows from the observation that
for given assumptions, the objective function in (2.4) has strictly increasing
marginal returns. An application of the theorem due to Amir (1996b) and
Edlin and Shannon (1998) on strict comparative statics completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let h ∈ (0, H¯] be given. From the definition, ξh(lˆ) =
u′(f(h,lˆ))f ′2(h,lˆ)
g′2(h,1−lˆ)
. Note that g′2 > 0 for all arguments. Hence, ξh(lˆ) is well defined
and ξh is continuous at the point lˆ = 1. Moreover, limlˆ→0 ξh(l) = ∞ and
ξh(1) = 0. As u
′ and f ′2 are strictly decreasing (with the second argument)
and g′2(h, 1 − lˆ) is strictly increasing as a function of l we conclude that ξh
is strictly decreasing on (0, 1]. As a result ξh is invertible and its inverse is
strictly decreasing. It is straightforward to verify (by strict monotonicity,
strict concavity and continuous differentiability of u′, f ′2 and g
′
2) that ξh is
continuously differentiable and ξ′h 6= 0. Function ξh is also proper because ξh
is continuous and ξ−1h (R+) ⊂ [0, 1] which is compact in the standard topol-
ogy on R. Finally recalling the global implicit function theorem we get that
function ξ−1h is also continuously differentiable.
Proof of Theorem 2: We will apply theorem 4 (see appendix) due to Guo,
Cho, and Zhu (2004). Observe that P is a normal solid cone. The fact that B
is a decreasing operator can be shown analogously to the proof of Theorem 1.
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We will now show that the condition (7.27) in Theorem 4 (see Appendix) is
satisfied.
Let l¯ ∈ P, l¯ 6= 0, h ∈ (0, H¯] and t such that 0 < t < 1 be given. For
a given r define a function φr : [0, 1] → R+, φr(t) = trB(tl¯)(h). We will
now show that there exists an r, 0 < r < 1, such that φr is increasing with
t on (0, 1). By monotonicity and continuity of φr from the left at 1 we will
conclude that there exists r, 0 < r < 1, for which the inequality φr(t) ≤ φr(1)
is satisfied and so is trB(tl¯) ≤ Bl¯.
From the definition of B(tl¯) we get: φr(t) = t
r
∫
H
v(f(y, ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))λ(dy).
Note also that l¯(y)v′(f(y, ξ−1h (tp(y))))f
′
2(y, ξ
−1
h (tl¯(y)))(ξ
−1
h )
′(tl¯(y)) is bounded
for a given l¯ and h. As a result, the function φr is continuously differentiable
and
φ′r(t) = t
r−1 [r ∫
H
v(f(y, ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))λ(dy) +
+t
∫
H
l¯(y)v′(f(y, ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))f
′
2(y, ξ
−1
h (tl¯(y)))(ξ
−1
h )
′(tl¯(y))λ(dy)
]
.
Denoting by Efx the elasticity of function f at point x in its domain observe
that the second integral in the above expression can be reformulated to:
t
∫
H
l¯(y)v′(f(y, ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))f
′
2(y, ξ
−1
h (tl¯(y)))(ξ
−1
h )
′(tl¯(y))λ(dy) =∫
H
v(f(y, ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))
[
v′(f(y,ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))
v(f(y,ξ−1h (tl¯(y))))
f(y, ξ−1h (tl¯(y)))
]
·[
f ′2(y,ξ
−1
x (tl¯(y)))
f(y,ξ−1h (tl¯(y)))
ξ−1h (tl¯(y))
] [
(ξ−1h )
′(tl¯(y))
ξ−1h (tl¯(y))
tl¯(y)
]
λ(dy) =∫
H
v(ξ−1h (tl¯(y)))E
v
f(y,ξ−1h (tl¯(y)))
Ef,2
ξ−1h (tl¯(y))
E
ξ−1h
tl¯(y)
λ(dy).
Using the above reformulations and condition (2.10) we conclude that there
exists an r, 0 < r < 1, such that r ≥ −Ev
f(y,ξ−1h (tl¯(y)))
Ef,2
ξ−1h (tl¯(y))
E
ξ−1h
tl¯(y)
holds for
any h ∈ (0, H¯] and t, 0 < t < 1, and l¯ ∈ P, l¯ 6= 0. Adding non-negativity of
v, we obtain: ∫
H
rv(f(y, ξ−1x (tl¯(y))))λ(dy) ≥
−
∫
H
v(f(y, ξ−1x (tl¯(y))))E
v
f(y,ξ−1h (tl¯(y)))
Ef,2
ξ−1h
(tl¯(y))E
ξ−1h
tl¯(y)
λ(dy). (7.30)
It follows that φ′r(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ (0, 1) (since r does not depend on l¯ or h).
Hence, φr is increasing on (0, 1) for this r. Adding continuity of φr from the
left at 1 we have: trB(tl¯) ≤ Bl¯ for any t ∈ (0, 1] and any l¯ ∈ P . We conclude
therefore, that for all h ∈ (0, H¯] the inequality trB(tl¯) ≤ Bl¯ holds for any t, l¯
as required by Theorem 4.
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Proof of Theorem 3: Consider two families of functions parametrized by
h ∈ (0, H¯], denoted as Sh,Zh : [0, 1] → R+, such that for a given h ∈
(0, H¯], Sh(l) = u(f(h, l)) + δg(h, 1− l)
∫
H
u(f(y, lMPE(y)))λ(dy) and Zh(l) =
u(f(h, l)) + δg(h, 1 − l) ∫
H
V (y)λ(dy), where V is the value function corre-
sponding to the Bellman equation (3.12).
We would like to show that for any given h, S ′h(l) > Z
′
h(l) in their whole
domain. To this end, first note that
u(f(h, lMPE(h))) ≤ max
l∈[0,1]
u(f(h, l)) <
< max
l∈[0,1]
{u(f(h, l)) + δg(h, 1− l)
∫
H
V (y)λ(dy)} = V (h). (7.31)
From the above reasoning, it immediately follows that∫
H
u(f(y, lMPE(y)))λ(dy) <
∫
H
V (y)λ(dy) (7.32)
and hence:
S ′h(l) = u
′(f(h, l))f ′2(h, l)− δg′2(h, 1− l)
∫
H
u(f(y, lMPE(y)))λ(dy) >
u′(f(h, l))f ′2(h, l)− δg′2(h, 1− l)
∫
H
V (y)λ(dy) = Z ′h(l),(7.33)
which completes the first part of the proof.
Now let us superimpose another function T : {1, 2} × [0, 1] → R+ on top
of that, such that T (1, l) = Z(l) and T (2, l) = S(l). From inequality (7.33)
we have that T ′2(2, l) > T
′
2(1, l), and thus T has increasing marginal re-
turns with i = 1, 2. For i = 1, 2, the function T (i, ·) defined on the lattice
[0, 1] is thus supermodular. Hence, by the theorem due to Amir (1996b)
and Edlin and Shannon (1998), we obtain that (∀h ∈ (0, H]) lMPE(h) =
arg maxl∈[0,1] T (2, l) > arg maxl∈[0,1] T (1, l) = lR(h).
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